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Abstract—Data security, which is concerned with the pre-
vention of unauthorized access to computers, databases, and
websites, helps protect digital privacy and ensure data integrity.
It is extremely difficult, however, to make security watertight, and
security breaches are not uncommon. The consequences of stolen
credentials go well beyond the leakage of other types of informa-
tion because they can further compromise other systems. This
paper criticizes the practice of using clear-text identity attributes,
such as Social Security or driver’s license numbers—which are
in principle not even secret—as acceptable authentication tokens
or assertions of ownership, and proposes a simple protocol
that straightforwardly applies public-key cryptography to make
identity claims verifiable, even when they are issued remotely
via the Internet. This protocol has the potential of elevating the
business practices of credit providers, rental agencies, and other
service companies that have hitherto exposed consumers to the
risk of identity theft, to where identity theft becomes virtually
impossible.
Index Terms—Computer Security, Authentication, Identity
management systems, Technology social factors, privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent data breach at consumer credit reporting agency
Equifax has compromised sensitive personal information such
as Social Security numbers, birth dates, and driver’s license
numbers of as many as 143 million US consumers and up to
44 million British residents [16]. Consumers are outraged and
concerned about the looming threat of falling victim to identity
theft. Dozens of people whose personal data were leaked have
filed lawsuits against Equifax. Politicians decry the lack of
control that consumers have over their information as it is
collected and sold by companies. Senator Warren and others
were the first to respond with legislation they introduced as the
Freedom from Equifax Exploitation (FREE) Act [29], which
would let consumers “freeze” and “unfreeze” their accounts
at no cost. In the meantime, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has started an investigation into the hack, scrutinizing
the company’s data security practices for possible neglect.
While all these responses address legitimate concerns re-
garding the business practices of credit reporting agencies and
emphasize the necessity of companies taking responsibility for
the protection of personal information that is stored on their
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servers, one very important question remains unasked: Why,
in this day and age, do we allow plain-text, copyable strings
of characters to serve as a means of authentication?
This paper provides answers to this question, and it suggests
a path forward by providing a practical solution towards
improving the state of affairs. In particular, it shows how well-
established cryptographic algorithms can be leveraged to dras-
tically improve the verifiability of identity claims. The result is
a secure and verifiable format for the storage and exchange of
identity claims, which, once it establishes itself as an industry
standard, would render plain-text personal information useless
for the purpose of committing identity fraud. Had this kind
of technology been deployed, the Equifax breach would have
still been problematic from a privacy standpoint, but it would
not have subjected millions of consumers to a substantial risk
of falling victim to identity fraud.
II. BACKGROUND
The problem of identity theft is multifaceted, and it can
be studied through many different lenses. While the tech-
nical execution of an attack can be explained in terms of
computer science, engineering, or even psychology (social
engineering [14]), the phenomenon also can be treated as
a societal problem, and its incidence be explained in the
frameworks of law and economics. FTC consumer complaint
statistics indicate that identity theft has been steadily on the
rise throughout the 2000s [12]. Two very different explanations
for this have gained traction in the legal academic literature.
On the one hand, Lopucki [20] argues that the decline of public
life and the gradual removal of contact information from public
registers has lead to an inability of businesses to authenticate
clients. Solove [26], on the other hand, attributes the problem
to a lack of control that consumers have over their personal
information. This lack of control increases the likelihood that
one’s personal information ends up in the hands of criminals.
The thesis of this article is that neither Lopucki nor Solove
is right. Of course, impersonation is easier when it can be done
over the phone or from behind a computer screen, but publicly
available personal information—precisely because it is pub-
licly available—can be no useful aid in identifying fraudsters.
The lack of control over personal information, however, is
problematic, but particularly because it is violating of privacy,
not because it necessarily weakens security. Besides, given
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the mega security breaches that we have seen over the recent
years (Home Depot, Target, and JPMorgan have had high-
profile security breaches, all of which occurred fairly recently,
in 2014 [28]), so much data has already been leaked that there
is little left to control. The solution to identity theft must
therefore not be sought in measures that limit or increase
access to personal data, but in a mechanism that protects
against the improper usage of personal data.
III. INCENTIVES AND RISK
Commercial businesses optimize their activities to maximize
net profit. As such, fraud is a risk like any other that needs
to be managed. One way to manage risk is to invest in
measures that reduce the risk, another is to insure against
damages. Companies will make a trade-off between these
strategies that they expect is most profitable [5], [2]. Pre-
ventative measures can reduce insurance expenses and foster
consumer trust (which potentially leads to higher revenue), but
the cost of implementing preventative measures may outweigh
the reduction in insurance cost, in which case the question
remains: How pertinent are those measures to the customer
experience? If a risk poses no threat to loss of revenue and
it is more effective to insure against damages, a company has
no incentive to allocate budget for prevention. The only other
factors that will tip the scale towards prevention are laws, rules,
and regulations which, if not abided by, could hurt business
via lawsuits, license revocations, or fines.
Credit card companies are notorious for the poor security
of their payment methods: particularly in the US, transactions
normally do not require the customer to enter a PIN-code,
and in-person transactions typically require no identification;
sometimes not even a signature. Purchases made through
the Internet often do not involve any authentication at all;
it is typically sufficient to enter the card holder name and
billing address, along with the credit card number and CCV.
It is easy to explain why credit card companies continue to
use such primitive technology: it is more profitable to do
so. Sophisticated security measures are costly to implement,
but, perhaps more importantly, they potentially make it more
complicated (or impossible) to make purchases, particularly
online, via phone, or in remote areas where direct authenti-
cation of a transaction may not be feasible. Hence, improved
security, aside from the cost of implementing it, could lead to
a reduction in revenue. Apparently, these costs are expected to
outweigh the cost of credit card fraud. Instead of improving
security to prevent fraud, credit card companies have shifted
their focus to just-in-time fraud detection, leveraging statistical
models (e.g., [27]) and machine learning techniques (e.g., [21])
to identify suspicious transactions in order to block them or
verify their legitimacy with the customer. This turns out to
be an adequate solution for the merchant, the consumer, and
credit card issuer; the financial damage of credit card fraud
is mitigated with minimal impact on the customer experience,
and the financial liability is absorbed by the card issuer or the
merchant.
As shown in the credit card example, when there exists
a direct relationship between a business and its customer,
damage control may indeed be a more pragmatic answer to
fraud than it is to try to prevent it. The problem is: there
might not be such relationship. In the case of Equifax, other
businesses, not consumers, are the company’s customers. It
would be more accurate to say that consumers (or their data)
are Equifax’s product. Hence, Equifax has little incentive to
align its interest with the interests of consumers. On the
contrary, safeguarding consumer data is a costly undertaking.
If companies like Equifax were more invested in protecting
consumer data breaches may be less likely to occur, but
impenetrable security is very difficult (if not impossible) to
achieve. And when a breach does occur, where a credit card
company can simply issue new credit cards and block and
revoke compromised ones, data brokers and credit reporting
agencies have no such power with respect to the data they
handle. This leaves the burden of having to deal with the
aftermath of a potential abuse of any stolen information to
rest entirely on the affected consumers, even though they
never entrusted the company that leaked their information with
storing their personal data to begin with.
An example of such an aftermath is the more insidious
variant of a credit card fraud that entails the illegitimate
creation of a new account, which can take months before it is
discovered. Again, it is a misalignment of incentives between
businesses and their customers that ends up facilitating identity
theft. In [17], Hoofnagle exposes just how embarrassingly easy
it is for impostors to obtain credit or medical services. The
paper discusses sixteen cases of identity fraud, and in almost
all of these cases credit or services were granted on the basis
of applications that were rife with errors that should have
suggested fraud. Yet, because most of the cost of identity theft
is externalized, and businesses make a trade off that optimizes
their own profit, they choose to issue credit or provide services
even in marginal situations. Companies do not want more
rigorous screening because it will cost them revenue. This
textbook example of externalizing cost will not disappear
unless careless application screening are to become penalized
by law, or the injury that results of negligent screening is to
be considered a legal basis for a tort claim.
Of course, Equifax is now in a world of legal trouble as
it faces lawsuits that are seeking class action status [1]. The
legal battle that shall unfold in the years to come may lead
the industry to re-evaluate its priorities with respect to the
protection of consumer data, but that will only address part
of the problem. The remainder of this article discusses a
technical solution to the data breach problem that, instead
of focusing on improvement of data confidentiality, aims to
diminish the practical value of plain-text personal information
by providing a reliable method for proofs of identity. It is clear,
however, that the industry cannot be expected to take the lead
in adopting this technology unless a change is incentivised or
enforced by law.
IV. CERTIFIED IDENTITY CLAIMS
The purpose of a Certified Identity Claim (CIC) is for a
relying party (RP) e.g., an airline, to obtain from a subject
(S), e.g., a traveler, an attestation of the relationship between
S and some set of attributes (e.g., last name, date of birth,
and passport number)—information similar to that which was
compromised by the Equifax breach. The use of CICs is a
solution to the problem of identity theft, which entails the
fraudulent use of attributes that relate to another individual
than the person using them, for example, to gain unwarranted
access to resources. It is the ability to verify the relationship
between an identity claim and the entity that issues it that
makes identity theft virtually impossible.
Sidebar: Encryption and Digital Signatures
Public-key cryptography algorithms use a separate key
for encryption and decryption. A key pair consists of
a private and a public key. The private key must be
kept secret by its user, while the public key is safe
to share with others. Once something is encrypted
with a private key, it can only be decrypted with the
corresponding public key, and vice versa.
Example: Alice (A) and Bob (B) have the fol-
lowing key pairs, respectively: {Apub, Aprv} and
{Bpub, Bprv}. A and B can now securely exchange
messages between each other by encrypting them with
each others’ public key. A prepares the secret message
for B as follows: Bpub(S). B (and only B) can read S
by decrypting the message: Bprv(Bpub(S)). The same
machinery can be used to issue signatures, simply
by swapping the order in which the keys are used.
B can apply a signature to a contract C as follows:
Bprv(C), and anyone, including A, can read it using:
Bpub(Bprv(C)), and be assured that the message truly
originates from B. If it were signed with another key
than Bprv , the contents of C would not be readable.
The certification of identity attributes is carried out by a
trusted third party, referred to as the attribute authority (AA).
In this system, identity theft would require an attacker to
either compromise the security between S and AA or steal
the private key of AA. Both are very difficult to achieve, and
both are reparable, respectively by resetting S’s authentication
credentials or by revocation of AA’s certificate.
A. Verification of CICs
The use of a CIC involves a particular sequence of actions
and message exchanges. Let us examine the message sequence
that is presumably the most common, where RP requests S to
prove ownership of some attribute, and S obliges by requesting
AA to provide a CIC, which S finally relays to RP. This
sequence, illustrated in Fig. 1, would substitute for requests for
uncertified identity claims which, on the Web, are ordinarily
solicited via a form that is rendered in the browser and filled
out manually with keyboard input from the user. An important
difference is that while an HTML form provides a description
that is understandable by humans, the request sent from RP
to S has to be passed along to a third party, AA, which, after
authenticating S, will have to parse the request and compile
an appropriate answer. All of the latter should be carried out
automatically, so the format of the request must be machine
readable. Importantly, the request must also be rendered in
a human-readable form to enable the user operating S to
determine whether it would indeed like to grant the request
and forward it to AA, or deny it and cancel the exchange.
Figure 1. A UML sequence diagram that describes issuance of a CIC.
If we examine Fig. 1 a bit closer, we see that the request
consists of three parts; a description, a nonce, and a certifi-
cate. The description encodes what particular information is
requested from S. The nonce is a randomly generated bit
string that is only used once, never across subsequent requests.
The nonce is required to prevent replay attacks. Because AA
bundles the requested attributes with the nonce that is provided
by RP, it is evident that the certification must have occurred
in response to RP’s request. Without the nonce, S could reuse
a CIC that it had previously obtained from AA, even if AA
would no longer certify the claim at the present time (e.g.,
because S no longer has an active account).
After authenticating S, AA obtains the request and has to
formulate a valid response. For instance, if RP is a lender and
S is a potential borrower, the request may look like [name,
credit_score], and the matching attributes would look
something like [’John Davis’, 589]. The next step is
to encrypt the attributes together with the nonce using the
public key of RP. The resulting cipher text is then signed
by AA (using its private key). The extra round of encryption
that is applied, before AA does its signing, is critical because
it prevents RP from being able to stage a man-in-the-middle
attack. Without it, RP would be able to retrieve a request from
another relying party, say X, forward it to S (along with the
same nonce), obtain a CIC from S and submit it to X. Neither
X or S would be able to detect the attack. Because AA encrypts
the attributes with the public key of RP, X will not be able
to read them. It is important that the signature is applied after
the encryption and not the other way around. If the keys were
to be used in reversed order, RP would be able to decrypt the
signed attributes and encrypt them with X’s public key before
forwarding them to S. Alternatively, if RP were to present
X’s certificate to S instead of its own, the attack would be
detectable by S.
B. Trust
Before RP can verify a claim, it first has to decide whether
AA is authoritative to assert the veracity of the claim. The
authenticity of the certification provided by AA may be derived
from the certificate that RP receives from S. This certificate
ties the “common name” of the AA (e.g., bankofamerica.com)
to a public key, attested by a chain of trust that should lead
back to an intermediary or root CA that RP also trusts. The
most trivial way for RP to keep track of relationships between
AAs and the types of claims they are trusted to certify, is to
maintain a white list. Simply put, for each claims request that
RP makes, it will need to a priori decide whose certifications
it will accept as material. For example, for a claim that
establishes holdership of a bank account, all well-established
banks could be acceptable AAs. Another method would be for
RP to request a claim from AA and expect it to be certified
by the American Bankers Association. What this mechanism
basically gives rise to is a dynamic variant of a Public-Key
Infrastructure (PKI) that is guided by ad-hoc inquisition rather
than deliberate top-down one-off design.
C. Privacy
CICs can be viewed as a privacy-enhancing technology.
Apart from preventing misuse of personal information, the
use of CICs obviates the need for the collection of personal
information beyond what is strictly necessary. Because identity
claims are independently verifiable, there is no need to rely
on cross referencing with other information in order to gain
confidence in the authenticity of the claims. Better yet, a
relying party will be less inclined to rely on omni-directional
identifiers [7] (i.e., information that uniquely identifies an
entity across multiple contexts, such as a Social Security
Number) if it can increase confidence in the veracity of the
identity claims it actually cares about. For instance, assume
that a service provider needs to determine eligibility on the
basis of an applicant’s age, taxable income, and marital status.
Instead of requesting copies of the applicant’s passport, tax
return, and marriage certificate, it could simply request CICs
that attest the required information, without even revealing as
much as the applicant’s name.
The decoupling between RP and AA is deliberate. The fact
that all communication between them goes through S puts
the user in maximal control of the information flow. In this
way, the user controls when and how often a third party can
access their personal information. Of course, modulo legal
provisions in a privacy statement, a user has no control over
what a third party does with the personal information it has
already acquired. However, particularly for transient claims
(e.g., account balance), it is useful that the protocol gives S the
power to throttle how often RP receives updates. Of course,
the decisions of S may well be performed automatically on the
basis of some predefined policy rather than having a human on
the loop. The avoidance of direct communication between RP
and AA could potentially also prevent AA from tracking the
activities of S, but the protocol in Fig. 1 reveals RP’s identify
to AA by sharing its public key.
Although a relying party is capable of storing the contents a
CIC in clear text, the sequence of cryptographic operations on
the information guarantees that RP cannot extend the ability
to verify the CIC to a third party without also handing over its
private key, which would compromise RP’s own security. To
inspect the CIC, it must first be decrypted with AA’s public
key and then once again with RP’s private key. Without the
latter step, the contents of the CIC is unreadable, and if the
claim is shared in clear text it is no longer verifiable.
D. Vulnerabilities
The security of CICs is predicated on some basic assump-
tions which, albeit reasonable, under certain circumstance
could be broken. Let us discuss them one by one.
1) Compromised keys: It is possible that the private key of
RP or AA gets stolen. This would impair the ability of S to
authenticate them, thus making sessions susceptible to man-
in-the-middle attacks. When AA has its private key stolen, the
trustworthiness of its signature is also compromised.
2) Faulty or dishonest parties: The cryptography prevents
attackers from tampering with claims, but it has no way to
prevent false information from ending up in a claim. Claims
are trusted on the basis of authority. In principle, AA could
certify a false claim, or it could impersonate S. However,
this sort of malicious behavior would violate trust and would
quickly lead to the demise of AA.
3) Broken random number generators: It is important that
a sufficiently random nonce is produced by RP. If it fails to
do so, S may be able to successfully “replay” a previously
issued CIC.
4) Quantum computers: The strength of public-key cryp-
tography hinges on the computational intractability of math-
ematical problems like prime factorization of large integers.
Quantum computers hold the promise of performing factor-
ization in exponentially less time than classical or stochastic
methods could [10]. Thus far, quantum computers are not that
capable, but there are reasonable expectations that quantum
supremacy is achievable in the not-too-distant future [6].
E. Adoptability
The proposed protocol can be implemented using off-the-
shelf technology and existing web standards (RSA [25] for
the signing and verification of claims, X.509 [18] for the
certificates that authenticate the signatures, HTTPS [24] for
end-point verification and secure communication), and would
require only a modest standardization effort. Specifically, the
syntax of requests and claims needs to be agreed upon,
and there must be a standardized conceptualization of the
attributes that can be featured in them: all parties involved
will need to understand the contents of a CIC. SAML [19]
is an XML-based standard that is already equipped with the
ability to encode assertions regarding identity attributes, but
the idea of certified identity claims could be extended beyond
the assertion of simple attributes. A more elaborate protocol
could potentially leverage the W3C Web Ontology Language
(OWL) [4] and allow for the formulation of more expressive
assertions that involve relationships between multiple entities
and certifications by multiple authorities.
An important feature of CICs is that they do not require
session-oriented protocols; CICs are self-contained and are
tied to a particular request by means of a nonce and a particular
RP via encryption. This means that the exchange of CICs
can be conducted entirely in a RESTful [11] fashion. Secure
connections are assumed between S and RP and S and AA. If
these connections are not secure, a man-in-the-middle attack
could be staged by an attacker who is interested in letting
the victim unwittingly submit claims that are not theirs but
the attacker’s. For instance, an attacker could hijack an online
purchase and reroute the delivery of the purchased item by
injecting a false shipping address. An obvious way to secure
the message exchange is to use HTTPS, which could also
facilitate authentication of RP and AA with respect to S. The
methods of authentication of S by RP and AA, respectively,
are intentionally left unspecified. Where one organization may
want rely on token-based authentication, another may want to
use key authentication, a password, biometrics, or some sort
of two-factor authentication. We can assume that the level
security implemented by RP and AA is proportional to the
sensitivity of the kinds of activities that it protects (e.g., money
transfers, access to medical records, etc.).
V. RELATED WORK
Public-key cryptography has been widely adopted as a
means to authenticate Web pages (X.509 certificates) and en-
crypt Web traffic (TLS/SSL). CICs and X.509 certificates are
similar, but where a X.509 certificate is designed specifically
to tie a public key to a hostname, organization, or individual,
a CIC may bear any sort of identity claim. Another difference
is that an X.509 certificate is signed by a Certificate Authority
(CA), whereas a CIC is signed by an Attribute Authority. This
distinction is significant, because the trustworthiness of a CA
is determined by its relationship with other CAs, whereas the
trustworthiness of an AA is determined with respect to a par-
ticular set of attributes, and stands or falls by the relationship
that the AA has with the subject. For example, the non-profit
organization Let’s Encrypt1 provides free SSL/TLS certificates
for any organization or individual that can demonstrate that
it controls the domain of the hostname it wishes to tie their
public key to. Verification of control is simple and can be
automated; the proof requires no more than the creation of a
provisioned DNS record and HTTP-accessible resource. But
how would just any AA verify whether an individual has any
outstanding traffic tickets, for instance? Indeed, it requires
an authority with access to very specific information about
the subject in order to veritably certify such identity claim.
1https://letsencrypt.org
To vouch for the absence of outstanding traffic tickets, the
Department of Motor Vehicles would be an bona fide authority,
but the American Automobile Association would not.
The concept of claims-based identity was pioneered by
Cameron [7] at Microsoft in the mid-2000s when he laid
out seven “laws” of identity, which provide useful guidelines
for the design of systems that cope with identity on the
Internet. Cameron proposes a definition of identity in terms
of claims rather than identifiers. With this definition, he shifts
the paradigm from identifying individuals to proving the
relationship between digital identity and real-world objects.
By choosing the term “claim” instead of “assertion,” he
emphasizes that this relationship is always imbued with some
level of uncertainty, and could manifest itself as a potential
weakness in any secure system. The protocol described in
this paper implements the first four of Cameron’s laws, which
boil down to: “user consent,” “minimal disclosure,” “justifiable
use,” and “context isolation.” The fifth law states that an
identity system needs to allow for pluralism of operators and
technologies, which the protocol also does, granted that it
leaves the method for end-point authentication unspecified.
The sixth and seventh laws are strictly concerned with user
experience, which is entirely outside of the scope of this paper.
The notion of federated identity captures the fact that
identity attributes are often stored across multiple distinct
identity management systems. Federated identity management
(FIM) [8] entails the exchange of identity information between
identity management systems. A subset of FIM is concerned
with single sign-on (SSO), in which a user’s single authenti-
cation ticket, or token, is trusted across multiple systems or
even organizations. Open standards for FIM are WS-Security
and its extension WS-Trust [3]. The goal of FIM is somewhat
different from CIC. Where FIM is designed to facilitate long-
term collaboration between businesses to provide services
to an overlapping customer base, CIC facilitates exchanges
between entirely unrelated stakeholders on a per-request basis.
Where FIM is aimed at providing tight integration between
federations, CIC provides a loose coupling. Popular SSO
protocols are OpenID [23] and OAuth [15]. Online platforms
like Google2 and Facebook3 also allow third parties to rely
on their user authentication mechanism and provide limited
access to their users’ account details.
Governments have also attempted to design systems for
identity management and authentication. Some have become
quite successful nationwide identity systems, and are lever-
aged for purposes as proof of age, proof of citizenship,
and for generating digital signatures. These government-run
systems, however, tend to poorly interact with commercially-
run systems. The National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace (NSTIC) that President Obama signed in 2011,
sought to change that by creating an “Identity Ecosystem”
for the improvement of online transactions [22]. The program
went through dozens of pilots, but the idea never materialized
2https://developers.google.com/identity/
3https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/
in any way, shape, or form that was ready for adoption.
Large and complex identity systems come with many risks
and challenges [9] such as over-centralization, lack of inter-
operability, possible privacy violations, etc. Basically, the more
problems a system attempts to solve, the more challenges
it presents to widespread adoption. Highly successful and
widely-adopted security mechanisms (e.g., HTTPS) tend to
be simple, only address a single issue, and tend not to have
too many dependencies on infrastructure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The problem of identity theft is a solvable problem; the
issue was not prevalent prior to the advent of Web technology
and e-commerce, and its current heavy manifestation indicates
a problem with the technology we rely on. A lack of sophisti-
cation in the way we verify personal information is to blame.
While some suggest that “data is the new currency,” [13], the
way we pass around personal information is the monetary
equivalent of exchanging plain-paper banknotes with hand-
written denominations on them. This primitive state of affairs
is not a reason to scrutinize the security of sites that retain
our personal information in order to prevent theft; it is an
argument for finding ways to verify the authenticity of personal
information—similar to how security features on paper money
help distinguish genuine bank notes from counterfeit ones.
The CIC protocol presented in this paper provides a simple
solution to the inexcusable lack of verifiability of identity
claims that leads to the tens of millions of cases of identity
theft and tens of billions of dollars of fraud damages that are
suffered, year after year. The protocol can be understood by
anyone with basic knowledge of public-key cryptography, it
is inherently distributed, it is fully interoperable with any ex-
isting authentication infrastructure, and it could be seamlessly
integrated into the online user experience as a substitute of
ordinary HTML forms.
Once the use of CICs becomes widespread, the use of clear-
text identity attributes can be abandoned altogether, which
would render security breaches, like the one that happened
to Equifax, considerably less detrimental. However, it will
be up to governments or regulators like the Federal Trade
Commission to impose restrictions on the acceptance of un-
verifiable user-provided electronic data, particularly for the
purpose of entering legally binding agreements, because most
businesses have very little incentive to impose such restrictions
themselves.
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